As a general rule, a trustee is not to be paid for his services. In order words, in the administration of trust, the trustee is generally held to act gratuitously or voluntarily and is therefore not paid for his services.  An appointed trustee could either from the settlor's family or could be a professional trustee such as: solicitors, trustee departments in banks, insurance companies and the public trustee who alone by virtue of sections 18 and 19 respectively of the Public Trustee Law and Act is statutorily enabled to be paid for his services. 

The exceptions to the rule that trustees are not to be paid for their services are as contain there under:

1. Express authorisation of the trust instrument: charging clauses are interpreted strictly to the effect that if the solicitor or other agent is entitled to charge for professional services as held in Clarkson v Robinson, only the services which fall within the expression may be charged for. In Chalinder v Harrington, the authorising clause indicated that the solicitor should be allowed all professional and other charges for his time and trouble notwithstanding his being such executor and trustee. It was held that that did not entitle the solicitor to charge for work not professional which could have been done personally by a trustee who was not a solicitor. In Re Wesheimes, the trustee who was a keeper of antiquities at the British Museum was held to be entitled under a charging clause to charge for commission on the sale of the testator's work of art. 

2. Authorisation by Statute: A public trustee is entitled to be paid for his services as of right under sections 19 and 18 of the Public Trustee Act and Public Trustee Law. 

3. Authorisation by the Court: The court in special circumstances have inherent powers statutorily to order that a trustee be paid, especially where the trust proves enormous. See section 29 of the Trustee Law. 

4. Authorisation through contract with beneficiaries: Although a trustee may earn remuneration through contractual dealing with the beneficiaries to that effect, however this is usually discouraged by the court on grounds of undue influence. 

5. Expenses: A trustee is entitled to be reimbursed for out of pocket expenses. Such out of pocket expenses include: insurance premiums, agent's fees where the employment is justified and cost of litigation etc. 

6. The rule in Cradock v Piper forms an exception too. 

Generally, only the law and trust instrument can legally control a trustee. The trust instrument and the rules of equity guide trustees in the administration of trust. Trustees are not obliged to consult beneficiaries or consent to their wishes. In effect, beneficiaries have no right to interfere in the performance by trustees of their duties and powers.  In Re-Brockband (1948), all the beneficiaries being 'sui juris' teamed up with one of the trustees in whom appointment of their nominee as a new trustee is vested. The other trustees resisted the demand and the court refused to compel the recalcitrant trustee to concur in the appointment of the new trustee. 

A beneficiary who is absolutely entitled to a trust property and who is 'sui juris' can compel the trustees to vest the trust property in him even if the trust instrument contains provision to the contrary. By this, the trust is brought to an end . This is known as the rule in Saunders v Vautie. In this case,  a trustee was directed to accumulate the income on a legacy until a specified date. The court held that as soon as the beneficiary became of age, since he was eventually entitled to the income, he could call for the transfer to him of the same capital sum at any time. 

Where the property in question is personalty as it happened in Re-Marshall, the beneficiary who is 'sui juris' can demand for his share of the property. If however the property is real estate such demand would not be allowed since once shared, the real estate would not fetch its proper proportion of the proceeds of sale of the whole estate. 

Generally, the court has no power to vary a trust and also has no power to authorize a departure from the terms of the trust, except in a case of emergency in the management or administration of trust property or in order to salvage the property such as in executing essential repairs in the trust property. 

Intoxication could either be voluntary or involuntary. Thus, while the Penal Code does not exempt a person from criminal responsibility by reason of voluntary intoxication, it does shields an offender where it is proved that his act was propagated by involuntary intoxication. This is the intake of the provision of the Penal Code Law in section 52

 where it provides thus:

"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication caused by something administered to him without his knowledge or against his will, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law."

Thus, all acts done or omitted to be done by  a person are legally excused under the Penal Code Law where involuntary intoxication is proved and sustained. 

The five methods incidental to the proof of ownership of land in Nigerian Courts are namely: 

(a) Evidence of traditional history of title.

(b) By production of title documents.

(c) By acts of ownership. 

(d) By acts of possession long enough to warrant the person in possession as the owner.

(e) By acts of possession of a adjoining or adjacent land in such a way as would make it probable that the owner of the adjoining or adjacent land is also the owner of the land in dispute. 

See Idundun V. Okumagba (10976) 6 – 10 SC 48,; Morenikeji V. Adebugun (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 825) 612; Ojah V. Eviawure (2000) FWLR (Pt. 57) 163; Okore V. Onuyejuwa (2001) FWLT (pt. 41) 1820.” Per BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL ,J.C.A ( Pp. 51-52, paras. C-B ). Quotation is from the case of GABDO v. USMAN (2015) LPELR-25678(CA)

My authorities are:

1. The Court of Appeal’s judgement in the case of GABDO v. USMAN (2015) LPELR-25678(CA)

2. Idundun V. Okumagba (10976) 6 – 10 SC 48

3. Morenikeji V. Adebugun(2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 825) 612;

4. Ojah V. Eviawure(2000) FWLR (Pt. 57) 163

5. Okore V. Onuyejuwa(2001) FWLT (pt. 41) 1820 

There can be no action for breach of promise unless a contract to marry has been made. There are no formal requirements regarding the contract. It need not to be evidenced by writing and the law prescribes no particular form of words. A promise by one person to marry another is not binding unless and until that other person also promises to marry the first person. Mutual promises to marry may be implied from the conduct of the parties. 

Two elements are necessary to constitute a breach of promise to marry:

a) it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that there was promise of marriage under the Marriage Act. 

(b) it must be shown that one party to the agreement has failed or refused to honour his obligation. 

On the fulfillment of these criteria, the aggrieved party who may be the man or the woman may sue for breach of contract and claim damages therefrom. 

Please note, no action to recovered damages will be sustained unless the testimony of the aggrieved party is corroborated by some other material evidence in support of the promise. This is the intake of section 197 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the decided case of Olusanya v Ibadiaran (1971) 1UILR 14 and Dagab v Kefas (1979) 2 LRN 334.

Furthermore, in the case of Bassela v Stern the plaintiff in breach of promise suit alleged that the defendant had seduced her and had reportedly promised to marry her. It was reported by the plaintiff that the plaintiff would always say to the defendant, 'you always promised to marry me, and you don't keep your word.' it was held by the court that this amounted to material evidence in corroboration of the promise. See also the case of Hansen v Dixon (1906) 96 LT 32.